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Abstract 
Social Media, particularly Microblogging services, are now being adopted as an additional tool for emergency 
service agencies to be able to interact with the community at all stages of a disaster. Unfortunately, no standard 
framework for Social Media adoption for disaster management exists and emergency service agencies are 
adopting Social Media in an ad-hoc fashion. This paper seeks to provide a general understanding of how Social 
Media is being used by emergency service agencies during disasters, to better understand how we might develop 
a standardised framework of adoption. In this study of the 2010/11 Queensland Flood event, Facebook broadcast 
messages from the Queensland Police Service to the general public, were analysed by genre. Findings show that 
these Microblogging activities were mostly about information distribution and warning broadcasts and that the 
strength of Social Media for two-way communication and collaboration with the general public, was under-
utilised during this event. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Although some Social Media services have had an impact on people’s everyday lives, most are still relatively 
new and have not yet been fully explored by emergency services agencies for their specific use (Queensland 
Police Service - Media and Public Affairs Branch 2011). Recently, government agencies have shown a 
significant interest in the use of Social Media services for interaction with the general public, especially during 
emergency and disaster situations (ACELG 2011; Queensland Police Service - Media and Public Affairs Branch 
2011). Unfortunately, no standard framework exists for adoption of Social Media in this context, so agencies 
have adopted Social Media according to their own individual requirements (Alam and Walker 2011). It is still 
unknown if government Social Media presence is effective, or if their attempts to adopt Social Media only 
consume resources which could be better used elsewhere. During a disaster, there is usually a lack of resources 
to support the effective collaboration of all stakeholders, and this highlights an enormous risk factor, as there are 
many unstructured tasks and a lack of skilled personnel to complete them.  
Some research is currently underway regarding how Social Media works during disaster incidents and how it can 
be effectively used to prepare and inform the community about disasters. (Bruns et al. 2012; Underwood 2010; 
Yates and Paquette 2011). This study is different, however, in that it examines the use of Social Media 
technologies and applications (Microblogging use of Facebook) specifically by an emergency management 
agency (QPS). For the purposes of this study, messages broadcast by the QPS during the January 2010/11 
Queensland Flood disaster underwent a genre analysis (Westman and Freund 2010).  
This analysis represents the first phase of the development of a conceptual framework for disaster response using 
Social Media. Such a framework could assist emergency service agencies to improve their processes for the 
management of, and response to crises and disasters by encouraging more effective communication and 
collaboration with the general public. 
This paper is structured as follows. Firstly, an overview about Social Media in disaster management is given. 
Secondly, the Queensland Flood disaster of 2010/11 is discussed and the Social Media background of the case 
agency, the QPS is given. Thirdly, the research method and dataset is introduced and discussed. Fourthly, the 
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results of the genre analysis are presented. Finally, after a short discussion of the results, the paper concludes 
with recommendations for further research. 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
Social Media platforms are Internet-based applications that focus on the creation and exchange of User Generated 
Content (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). These applications which can be Social Networking Sites, Microblogging 
services, Wikis, Collaborative Web Maps, Media Content Sharing platforms or others, have the potential to 
contribute enormously in disaster management to the process of finding collaborative solutions to complex 
problems (Underwood 2010).  
In disaster management Social Media interaction can be seen in three dimensions. The first dimension is the 
interaction between emergency service agencies. The second dimension is the interaction between an emergency 
service agency and the community. The third dimension is the interaction between the community amongst 
themselves (Ahmed 2011). The focus of this study is narrowed to the communication between an emergency 
service agency and the community, enabled through the Microblogging functionality of the Social Networking 
site Facebook. 
Microblogging allows users to send and retrieve a short message, which appears on a web portal or on a third 
party client. In contrast to weblogs, the messages are mostly restricted in length to alphanumeric characters. This 
enables a quick and easy way to send short messages from a computer or a mobile device. Because of this, people 
use Microblogging services to update their friends, families or complete strangers about their whereabouts, 
activities or interesting thoughts (Zhang et al. 2010). 
Social Networking sites are web-based platforms, which support the user in networking over the Internet (Koch 
and Richter 2007, p. 54). A Social Networking Site gives an individual or a group, which can be, for example, a 
company or an agency, the opportunity to create a public or semi-public profile.  This profile is a representation 
of the user of the site. The user can communicate and form relationships with other users of that site. These 
relationship linkages are in most cases non-directional, but can also be directional (Boyd and Ellison 2008). Some 
Social Networking sites are for specific interests, some for the business sector and some have a general focus. 
Most Social Networking sites also support Microblogging in the form of status updates. The size of the messages 
at these Social Media sites, in most cases, is not as restricted as it is in pure Microblogging Services. The Social 
Networking site Facebook has a general focus and is, with over 900 million active users, the biggest Social 
Networking site globally (Facebook 2012).  
For effective disaster management, this is very important, because a wide range of people can be reached with the 
use of Facebook. The QPS uses Facebook and Twitter as the basis of their Social Media platform to interact with 
the community. The use of Social Media to support dynamic processes in times of disasters is not completely 
new. After the 9/11 Terror Attacks in 2001, individuals created wikis in order to find missing persons (Palen and 
Liu 2007). The case study of the 2007 Southern California Wildfire, highlighted the kind of Social Media 
channels the community used (Sutton et al. 2008) and illustrated that when classical media coverage was not 
sufficient for the community, Social Media services, especially Twitter, closed this coverage gap (Sutton 2010). 
A problem with using Social Media is that rumours can spread much more quickly, however it has been shown 
that developing Social Networks tend to favour trustworthy and valid information over rumours (Castillo et al. 
2011). 
Emergency service agencies have slowly started to adopt Social Media in the last few years (Queensland Police 
Service - Media and Public Affairs Branch 2011). Yates and Paquette (2011) highlight that no studies currently 
exist that examine the role of Social Media technologies and applications used by emergency service agencies. In 
their study, they examined the role of wikis and collaborative technologies such as Microsoft’s Share Point to 
manage knowledge during the Haiti 2010 earthquake (Yates and Paquette 2011). The Social Media channel 
Twitter is a current area of research focus and Bruns et al. (2012) have examined the developing networks on this 
platform during the 2010/2011 Queensland Flood  disaster. Their study included a small case study about the use 
of Twitter by the QPS, but the main focus of this study highlighted the behaviour of the community, not the 
adoption of the platform. In order to overcome this gap in our knowledge this study investigates the QPS 
Facebook adoption during the Queensland Flood disaster of 2010/11. 
QUEENSLAND FLOODS 2010/11 CASE STUDY 
Long lasting and intensive rainfalls over large areas of north eastern Australia during the wet season of 2010 led 
to large flooding in Queensland, which occurred in December 2010 and also in January 2011 (Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry 2011). During this time of flooding, nearly seventy-eight per cent of the state of 
Queensland had been declared a disaster zone (Queensland Reconstruction Authority 2011). This is an area 
bigger than the area of Germany and parts of France combined. Fifty-nine rivers flooded in Queensland, twelve of 
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them broke earlier flood records. 19,000 kilometres of state and local roads were at least at one time flooded and 
twenty-nine per cent of Queensland’s rail network was damaged. (Queensland Reconstruction Authority 2011) 
All in all, over 2.5 million people were affected through flooding and thirty-five people died in the floods, three 
of which are still declared as missing (Queensland Reconstruction Authority 2011). Over 29,000 homes and 
businesses had some form of inundation or damage caused by the floods. The Queensland Reconstruction 
Authority has estimated that the flooding events will cost more than 5 billion Australian dollars for restoration 
and reconstruction (Queensland Reconstruction Authority 2011). 
 
Figure 1 Flood events overview January 2011 
The Queensland Floods started at the beginning of December in 2010 and increased in intensity until the most 
destructive floods occurred in the second week of January 2011 in the southeast corner of Queensland 
(Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2011). Figure 1 gives an overview of some important flood 
incidents during the month of January.  
At the beginning of January, Rockhampton was strongly affected by the flood inundations. On the 4th of 
January, the Fitzroy River peaked. This event left Yaambo and Rockhampton isolated for several days. On the 
6th of January some supermarkets in the region of Rockhampton started to run low on supplies, because of this, 
the Australian Defence Force dropped food supplies in the isolated areas (Queensland Floods Commission of 
Inquiry 2011, p. 26). As the flood peaked in Balonne River on the 8th of January, the river water supply at St. 
George failed. This river water supply was necessary for sanitary water, but not for drinking water supply, 
nevertheless, this caused a lot of rumours about the water supply of St. George and surroundings (Queensland 
Floods Commission of Inquiry 2011). 
On the 10th of January, heavy rainfall in the Toowoomba area caused enormous flash flooding events in 
Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley. There was no sufficient community warning in both events and the floods 
caught people by surprise with the authorities being informed about these disaster events mostly by emergency 
calls to the police (Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2011, p. 237). 
On the 12th of January, the Bremer River at Ipswich experienced its major flood peak since 1974. A lot of 
Ipswich infrastructure was damaged. The peak of flooding eased fast, so on the 13th of January, the clean up 
crews could start their work in Ipswich (Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2011, p. 27). 
On the 11th January the major flooding of Brisbane commenced. The flood level on the 12th of January affected 
14,100 Brisbane properties. On the 13th of January, the Brisbane River had its major peak of about 4.46 meters. 
On the weekend after the Brisbane flood, more than 20,000 volunteers helped clean up and recover the city 
(Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2011, p. 27). After the 15th of January, the floods began to slowly 
ease. Queensland went into the recovery stage of the disaster until the end of January. On the 31st of January, 
Tropical Cyclone Anthony crossed the coastal strip between Townsville and Mackay and caused a significant 
amount of rainfall. On the second of February, Tropical Cyclone Yasni hit Queensland (Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority 2011). 
QPS and Social Media 
Former disaster events, for example, the Mumbai terrorist attacks, (Oh et al. 2010) have shown that the 
mainstream media coverage was dominated by Social Media but the government authorities were not able to 
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contribute to, or manage the Social Media streams with their own Social Media presence in any effective way. To 
work against this effect, the QPS wanted to get some experience with this communication medium to create an 
online community of followers before any disaster occurred (Queensland Police Service - Media and Public 
Affairs Branch 2011, p. 2). In May 2010, the QPS Media and Public Affairs Branch began an extensive trial use 
of the Social Media platforms Facebook1, Twitter2 and YouTube3 (Queensland Police Service - Media and Public 
Affairs Branch 2011, p. 2). With this trial, they wanted to enable a new channel for two-way communication and 
collaboration between the QPS and the general public (Queensland Police Service - Media and Public Affairs 
Branch 2011, p. 2). 
The QPS used Social Media streams during the 2011 flood disaster mostly to get information and warnings out to 
their following community and the public. They wanted to act as a “centralised clearing house for disaster-related 
information” (Queensland Police Service - Media and Public Affairs Branch 2011, p. 5) so they published 
information from the QPS as well as trusted information from other departments and government authorities on 
their Facebook page as well as tweeting the information on Twitter.  
Before the Queensland Floods of 2010/11 occurred, interest in the QPS by the community was minor but it still 
existed.  In the first few months between May 2010 and the beginning of December 2010, the growth of “Likes” 
of the QPS Facebook page was steady and constant. The page had about 7000 “Likes” at the beginning of 
December. These seven months of steady growth gave the QPS time to get comfortable with this medium and 
time to educate their Social Media team. At the beginning of the trial use in May, only a few selected staff 
managed the QPS Social Media accounts. Over that time, all members in the team were responsible for uploading 
information and moderating Social Media channels (Queensland Police Service - Media and Public Affairs 
Branch 2011, p. 2). 
The Queensland Floods caused two significant boosts of “Likes” on Facebook. The first boost occurred in 
December 2010 and doubled in number. About 14,000 people followed the QPS Facebook account by the end of 
December 2010. The second more powerful boost occurred after the flash flooding events of Toowoomba and the 
Lockyer Valley on the 10th of January 2011, and at the beginning of the flooding of Brisbane on the 11th January. 
“Likes” of the QPS Facebook page increased from 14,000 to over 160,000 (Queensland Police Service - Media 
and Public Affairs Branch 2011, p. 2). This disaster caused the public to have a very high need for verified 
information, and the public tried to satisfy this need by accessing perceived trusted sources of information like 
that provided by the QPS. In fact, 160,000 people could be reached with the messages from the QPS with the help 
of this account.  
DATA ANALYSIS  
Genre analysis has long been used in fields like arts and literature. In Information Systems research, genre 
analysis was adapted mostly for two purposes. The first was to examine the relationship between the 
communication practices and technologies inside organisations (Firth and Lawrence 2003). The second purpose 
was to detect and analyse technology adoption patterns which emerge in context (Westman and Freund 2010). 
With genre analysis it is possible to detect and analyse communication patterns within and between organisations 
and individuals, which can give researchers better insights into communication practices and channel use in a 
given context (Riemer et al. 2011). In this study, genre analysis was used to understand the communication 
practices between an emergency service agency (QPS) and the general public via a Social Media channel 
(Facebook), during a disaster (Queensland Floods, January 2010/11).  
Data Set and Analysis Techniques 
The dataset consists of Facebook Notes broadcasted by the QPS on their Facebook Page. The dataset was 
manually collected and prepared for analysis. The focus of this study was on Facebook Notes, so the normal 
Facebook Wall posts were not gathered. Furthermore, only the Facebook Notes for the month January 2011 and 
the first day of February were collected, since the most destructive flood events occurred in this timeframe. The 
QPS Media and Public Affairs Branch posted 765 Facebook Notes, in this time. These Facebook Notes were the 
start topic of single conversation lines with the community. Therefore, within this paper, these single 
conversation lines are called threads. 
In the process of the genre analysis, each thread of the collected Facebook data was based on the purpose and 
content of the message, and clustered into different genres. Genres are in this context seen as “recognizable 
categories of information objects, based on conventions of form, purpose and content.” (Westman and Freund 
2010) Some threads had more than one purpose, so each thread could be affiliated with up to two different 
                                                 
1 http://www.facebook.com/QueenslandPolice 
2 http://twitter.com/#!/QPSmedia 
3 http://www.youtube.com/user/QueenslandPolice 
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categories. In Step 1 of the analysis, a genre category was allocated in an attempt to explain what the QPS was 
trying to achieve with a specific thread. In Step 2 of the analysis, the different genre categories were analysed 
with a bottom-up procedure condensed into top-level genres.  
The proportions of the top-level genres (to each other) and the proportions of the genres themselves (to each 
other) were also analysed in Step 3. The performance of the top-level genre over the time (of the data set) was 
analysed and additionally, the result was mapped against the chronology of the flood events in Step 4. In Step 5, 
the community reaction per top-level genre was analysed to see which genre had the most impact on the 
community, and which genre did not have such high influence. 
Three different disasters could be isolated in the dataset. These three disasters were: the Queensland flood events 
of 2010/2011; tropical cyclone Anthony; and the warning and threat phase of tropical cyclone Yasni. Dataset 
statistics are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 General statistical overview  
 Threads Comments Likes 
Total: 765 29194 24409 
Average per day: 23.9 756 762.8 
Maximum: 68 at 11th January 4501 at 11th January 3924 at 13th January 
Minimum: 2 at 22nd January 57 at 4th January 37 at 4th January 
Genre appearances: 1071 Genres per thread: 1.4 average 
Genre Compositions 
The result of the 5 step genre analysis is a set of 15 genres, identified by communication purpose. These genres 
could be condensed into 5 top-level genres. Table 2 shows the five top-level genres, with their distribution within 
the data set and a short description of each. 
Table 2 Top-level Genre overview 
Top-Level 
Genre Name 
Proportional 
Distribution 
Description 
Broadcast 
Information 
59% Main purpose of informing the community about actual occurrences and 
situations. 
Broadcast 
Warning 
18% Intention to warn the community about different threats. 
Encourage 
Behaviour 
13% Purpose to urge action from the community.  
Appeal for 
Information 
8% Possibility of two-way communication in Social Media. It is with the intention of 
getting information from the community (has no further sub-genre). 
Fighting 
Rumours 
2% Refers to threads that have the intention to clarify false or misleading information 
circulating throughout the community or traditional print media (has no further 
sub-genre). 
Table 3 introduces the single sub genre with their distribution within their top-level genre and a short description. 
The Fighting rumours and the Appeal for Information genre are not shown in Table 3 since these genres are the 
only genre in their top-level genre and were therefore already introduced in Table 2. 
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Table 3 Sub-Genre overview 
Top-Level 
Genre 
Sub-Genre Distribution Description 
Broadcast 
Information 
Road 
Information 
18% Threads with the intention of informing the community about 
flooded, closed or reopened roads and intense traffic volume. 
Flood 
Information 
18% Threads discussing revoked flood warnings and flood levels of 
rivers or specific areas. 
Weather 
Information 
8% Information about future rainfall, regular weather events or 
cancelled weather warnings. 
Information 
about Supply 
2% Inform the community about imminent re-supply of resources 
such as food, water, good or gas. 
Information 
about Energy 
Supply 
4% Threads that announce the cutting off, re-supply or availability of 
electrical power in specific areas. 
General 
Information 
50% Threads with a general information focus and also all threads 
referring to normal police-work. 
Broadcast 
Warning 
Flood 
Warning 
45% Warnings about raise of river flood levels or supposed flood 
flashing events. 
Weather 
Warning 
49% Intention to warn the community about intense future weather 
events like thunderstorms or tropical cyclones.  
General 
Warning 
6% These warnings are those, which do not fall into the other genres 
but still warn the community about threats. 
Encourage 
Behaviour 
Navigate 
Behaviour 
8% Attempt to navigate the community to a specific behaviour, like 
preparing for inundation and not to enter flood water. 
Appeal for 
Volunteers 
74% This genre provides information where volunteers are needed 
and discussions of individuals offering themselves. 
Appeal for 
Donations 
5% Threads refer to individuals who are interested in donating and 
are looking for trustworthy institutions. It also provides 
information from different institutions as to where to donate 
goods or money. 
Evacuation 16% Advice of which areas to evacuate and provides information 
about evacuation shelters. 
Communication Patterns 
The threads broadcast by the police, in the dataset can be roughly divided into 5 stages. The first stage lasted from 
the 1st January to the 8th of January where the flooding of Rockhampton was present. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that this was also an important topic in the broadcasted threads. The second stage started at the 9th of 
January and ended approximately on the 14th of January. In this stage, the flash flooding event of Toowoomba 
and the Lockyer Valley occurred. In addition to this, the floods reached Brisbane. It was also not surprising that 
in this time the most broadcasted threads are present. The third stage lasted approximately from the 15th to the 
22nd of January. The number of threads slowly went down again. The floods were still ongoing locally but the 
intention of the threads went slowly from a remedy phase into a recovery phase. Between the 23rd and 29th 
January, which can be seen as the fourth stage, we see mostly threads about normal police work being broadcast. 
In this stage, disaster relevant topics were in the minority of threads. The 5th and last stage included the warning 
and impact phase of tropical cyclone Anthony as well as the warning phase of Tropical Cyclone Yasni. 
Figure 2 shows the number of threads mapped against the timeline of January 2011 and also shows some of the 
important disaster relevant events. Figure 3 shows the appropriation per top-level genre and in Figure 4; the 
relative appropriation per top-level genre through the time of the dataset can also be seen. 
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Figure 2 Number of threads mapped against the timeline of January 
 
Figure 3 Appropriation per top-level genre 
 
Figure 4 Relative appropriation per top-level genre  
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During the observed period of this study, the proportion of Broadcast Information (top-level genre) was 
consistently the largest. The proportion of the top-level genre oscillated, up to a few exceptions between 50 and 
75%. Due to the Broadcast Warning peaks, the percentage dropped on the 3rd, 5th, 6th and the 21st slightly under 
50%. The Fighting Rumours top-level genre from the frequency of broadcasts over the observed timeframe was 
also of minor importance. Nevertheless it should be noted that most of the rumours were apparently already 
fought where they occurred in the comment section of a post, and only a few of them were assigned their own 
thread in which they were handled.  In the observed time period, five warning peaks were monitored: at the 3rd, 
6th, 10th, and 20th of January with a minor peak at the 30th of January. Followed by these peaks, a significant rise 
of the Encourage Behaviour top-level genre is registered. When the remedy phase of the disaster was moving to 
the recovery phase in Brisbane, the Encourage Behaviour top-level genre stayed quite high and slowly declined 
back to a stage of normal police work. A rise of the Appeal for Information top-level genre can be observed after 
the impact phase of this disaster incident (in the remedy and recover phase). In the fourth stage, of normal police 
work, the Appeal for Information top-level was the second most frequently broadcast top-level genre.  
Community Reaction per Top-Level Genre 
It was anticipated that different top-level genres create, on average, a different amount of reaction from the 
listening community. This can be seen in the data, but is not as pronounced as we anticipated. Figure 5 shows the 
average community reaction per top-level genre thread. All threads considered the average reaction from the 
community in comments and “Likes” and it was shown that there were 38 comments and 32 “Likes” per thread. 
Because some threads are counted twice (since threads can have up to two genre appearances) the average per 
genre appearance is 27 comments and 22 “Likes”. 
 
Figure 5 Average community reaction per top-level genre thread 
Although the Fighting Rumours top-level genre was broadcast rarely, this top-level genre generated the most 
“Likes” which supports the conclusion that the community appreciated trustworthy information. Also the 
Encourage Behaviour top-level genre was highly appreciated by the community with “Likes” being over average 
and comments average.  
The Broadcast Information top-level genre i.e. the community reaction from the “Likes” as well from the 
comments, were average. The Broadcast Warning top-genre was average with comments and with “Likes” 
below average. This effect may be explained by the assumption that people do not want to “Like” bad news. 
The Appeal for Information created “Likes” that were over the average, but surprisingly the comments were 
below average. It is questionable if the two-way communication potential of Social Media was really used 
during this flood incident, since the appeal was sent through Social Media platforms, but the response from the 
general public was expected to be given through traditional communication channels such as telephone. 
DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS  
The analysis of this data showed that Microblogging and Social Networking had an important role to play in 
supporting communication and collaboration between the QPS and the general public during this flood event. 
With these tools, it was possible to deliver information and warnings to a wide range of people and also an 
attempt was made to direct the listening community to act in a specific way.  
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Information flows quickly inside a Social Media stream. This effect is even more pronounced during a time of a 
disaster. Incorrect information, however, can spread like a wildfire under these circumstances. Nevertheless, other 
researchers, for example Castillo, et al. (2011), show that social networks tend to favour valid information over 
rumours.  In addition to this, the work of Bruns et al. (2012) points out that although the QPS made relatively few 
posts on Twitter during this flood event, their tweets had a high impact on the community. This could be seen by 
the high amount of re-tweets and comments coming from the original QPS tweets (Bruns et al. 2012).  
The response to the broadcasted threads in comments and “Likes” has shown that reliable information is sought in 
times of a disaster. The QPS satisfied the needs of the community by posting detailed and extensive information 
from a trusted source i.e. the police. A problem is that this method can lead to an overload of information for the 
individual. Due to this information overload issue, important or necessary information can get lost. The QPS 
attempted to overcome information overload, by summarizing the most important information in a daily round-up 
during the disaster period. These round-ups were posts with the most important information posted during the day 
being summarised. Round-ups such as these can make it a lot easier to receive necessary information out of a 
high number of posts, but it is still possible that for many individuals important information can still get 
overlooked. A means of preventing this might be by pre-tagging all the broadcasted threads in Facebook. For 
example, a post which deals with road information could be specifically marked at the beginning of the message 
with something like “Road information:…”. This could help an individual to decide if the message will be 
relevant for them or not. 
Our data analysis also highlights that the use of Social Media channels such as Facebook and Twitter cannot be 
seen as totally distinct channels, since these channels have high interaction during disasters. In this flood incident 
data set, it was observed that a significant amount of Twitter tweets had a redirection link to the QPS Facebook 
page. Our analysis highlights that the QPS used Twitter as a range amplifier and Facebook as a more detailed 
information platform.  
Although two-way-communication and collaboration with the general public was in general, desired by the QPS 
during the disaster, it seems that the opportunity to use Social Media in this way was not fully utilised by them. 
This effect was probably increased through the high amount of user comments, which were often off topic, in the 
comment section in the single threads. The QPS used Facebook in the Queensland 2010/2011 Flood disaster 
mostly as an information and warning broadcasting platform, which allowed them to better disseminate 
information to the Social Media connected public. Our overall analysis would support the notion that QPS used 
Social Media more as a “megaphone”, and less to facilitate 2-way communication and collaboration, with the 
general public.  
CONCLUSION 
The target of this study was to create a better understanding of how Social Media can be, and is used by 
emergency services agencies. Our analysis of the use of Facebook by the QPS during the 2010/2011 Queensland 
flood event demonstrates that Social Media supported the management of five disaster communication objectives. 
These objectives were highlighted in our analysis by top-level genre categories. The QPS broadcast information 
and warnings which tried to encourage the community to behave in a specific manner; they also fought rumours 
and tried to generate an information flow in response, from the community. These are all activities that are 
necessary for the effectiveness of the police objective to preserve human life in a disaster scenario (State 
Emergency Management Committee NSW 2010). 
Through the fast rising number of “Likes” of the QPS Facebook page, it was possible to see that the community 
has a high interest in trusted information from government agencies during the time of a disaster. With the 
“Likes” and comments on the single threads it is possible to assume that the community does not only want to 
read about information, it also seems to seek interaction with the relevant agency with offers of help and 
assistance.  
The question remains, however, should emergency services agencies use the usual broadcast information 
approaches of old, slightly transferred to fit in a Social Media world, or is it possible to design a more effective 
approach, that can tap into the potential of Social Media two-way and collaborative communication channels? In 
order to answer this question, examination and development of much deeper insights into the use of Social Media 
channels in events and disasters, are necessary. We must better understand the impact that these genre categories 
have on the community during the management of specific disaster types as well as when they are applied to 
different geographical locations and jurisdictions. The interaction and effect of different Social Media streams, 
for example Twitter and Facebook, must also be analysed.  
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